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author. 1 Introduction
Empirical analysis has recently provided evidence in favor of an inverted U-
shaped relationship between competition and growth1; nonetheless, only few
theoretical models of growth and innovation are capable of explaining such
empirical evidence. This paper proposes a novel rationale for the U-shaped
relationship, stemming from a modiﬁed quality ladder model in which we
assume that ﬁrms compete à la Cournot in the intermediate good sector,
where positive externalities or spillovers on costs are present. It is just the
presence of a spillover eﬀect which justify the fact that a higher product
market competition may enhance growth, because it can inﬂuence positively
the proﬁts that reward innovators.
Standard Industrial Organization theory (Salop 1977, Dixit and Stiglitz
1977) and the ﬁrst generation of Schumpeterian growth models (Grossman
and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004)
predict that innovation and hence growth should decline with competition,
because more competition reduces the rents that reward successful innova-
tors. This discourages ﬁrms from investing in R&D, thus reducing the inno-
vation rate and as a consequence the long run growth rate of the economy.
However, the empirical literature, as Gerosky (1995) and Blundell, Griﬃth
and Van Reenen (1999), suggests a positive correlation between competi-
tion and growth. The theoretical literature tried to solve this dilemma by
modifying radically the assumptions of the basic Neoschumpeterian model.
For example Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) introduce agency con-
siderations in the decision-making problem of innovating ﬁrms. In particu-
lar they embed the agency model of Hart (1983) in an endogenous growth
framework and show that competition has a positive eﬀect on growth be-
cause, combined with the threat of bankruptcy, it can act as a discipline
device (since it reduces the “slack”, that is the amount of free cash available
to managers), capable of fostering technology adoption and growth. How-
ever empirical evidence of these eﬀects is mixed, as shown, for instance, by
Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) and Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997).
Another approach (see Aghion, Harris, Vickers 1997 and Aghion, Harris,
Howitt, Vickers 2001) extends the basic Schumpeterian model by allowing
incumbent ﬁrms to innovate. This is obtained by assuming a technological
progress which is more “gradualist” (“step-by-step”) than the standard mod-
els, where the leap-frogging of the previous incumbent is possible: innovation
allows a ﬁrm to move one step ahead, with the lagging ﬁrm remaining active
1See: Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005)
1and eventually capable to chatch up. In this models it is assumed that each
intermediate good sector is characterized by a duopoly in which ﬁrms com-
pete both in production and in R&D. Hence, since in this framework R&D
is undertaken by the incumbents, the incentive to innovate depends not so
much upon post-innovation rents per se, but more upon the diﬀerence be-
tween post-innovation and pre-innovation rents (the latter are equal to zero
in the basic Schumpeterian model). In this case product market competi-
tion may act by reducing ﬁrms’ pre-innovation rents more than it reduces
their post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the
incremental proﬁts from innovating and thereby encourage R&D investments
aimed at escaping competition. This happens in those industries where both
ﬁrms are technological par (leveled or neck-and-neck sectors), while in un-
leveled sectors the Schumpeterian eﬀect of business stealing always prevails.
The eﬀect of an increase in product market competition on growth is am-
biguous and depends on the size innovation. If the latter is suﬃciently large,
the Shumpeterian eﬀect always dominates; if it is suﬃciently close to its
lower bound , the escape competition eﬀect prevails; ﬁnally for intermedi-
ate values the predicted relationship between competition and growth is an
inverted-U-shape: the escape competition eﬀect tends to dominate for low
initial levels of competition, whereas the Schumpeterian eﬀect tends to dom-
inate at higher levels of competition. This prediction is in line with earlier
ﬁndings of Scherer (1967), Levin, Vohen and Mowery (1985) and others2
and has also been tested by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt
(2005) using data from a panel of U. K. ﬁrms (the data run from 1973 to
1994). The same result is obtained by d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira
and Gerard-Varet (2002) in a model in which there is the possibility of mul-
tiple winners3of the patent race, asymmetric ﬁrms in the product market
and imperfect patent protection.
Another attempt to show the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship
between competition and growth can be found in Denicolò and Zanchettin4
(2004). They build a Neoschumpeterian model in which they allow for several
ﬁrms to be simultaneously active in each industry (because the innovation is
non drastic) and identify circumstances (a large size of innovation or a high
intensity of competition, or both) in which the productive eﬃciency eﬀect
(the reduction of total industry costs due to the fact that low-cost ﬁrms have
2See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a brief survey of the empirical literature.
3The number of ﬁrms is endogenously determined and the set of successful ones is
drawn by a Bernoullian random process.
4They measure competition as a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition, so as
a switch of the equilibrium price under the diﬀerent regimes of competition.
2a large portion of the market) dominates the business stealing eﬀect. This
and the presence of a front loading eﬀect (in more competitive markets, a
larger fraction of innovation rents accrues in the early stages of the innovative
ﬁrm’s life cycle) imply that the equilibrium rate of growth tends to increase
with the intensity of competition.
Recently also Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2010) provided a new ex-
planation of the inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and
growth based on the standardization process of the new technologies. Stan-
dardization is a costly process which is undertaken by newcomers: the lower
is this cost, the higher is the intensity of competition. When standardiza-
tion is very costly, growth is low because the new product does not enter the
standardization process and so it is produced by employing skilled workers
and this reduces the scale of production and the proﬁtability. On the other
hand, when standardization is cheap, the growth rate is still low because
innovators enjoy ex post proﬁts only for a short while.
In our paper we modify a standard quality ladder model and diﬀerently
from Aghion et al. (2001) we assume that R&D is driven by outsider ﬁrms
and the winners of the race sell licenses over their patents, instead of entering
directly the intermediate good sector. As a reward they get the aggregate
proﬁt of the industry. Moreover, we depart from Aghion et al. (2001) models
because, instead of assuming a duopoly in which ﬁrms compete à la Bertrand,
we suppose that in the intermediate good sector an unspeciﬁed number of
ﬁrms compete à la Cournot and we assume that there are spillovers on costs
in the form of strategic complementarities. The latter constitutes our key
assumption. In fact our goal is to prove that there exists an interval of values
of the spillover parameter such that the relationship between competition and
growth is an inverted-U-shape, giving thus another theoretical foundation to
the empirical evidence. In such case, when competition is low the spillover
eﬀect dominates the Schumpeterian business stealing eﬀect and an increase
in product market competition fosters growth. This is justiﬁed by the fact
that incumbents ﬁrms may beneﬁt from more competition as it increases the
positive externality by a reduction of costs. When, instead, competition is
high, the business stealing eﬀect prevails over the spillover eﬀect. We use the
number of ﬁrms in each sector as a measure of competition, thus an increase
in competition is expressed by an increase in the number of competitors. We
think that this is the most natural measure of competition in a Cournotian
framework5. It is customary in macroeconomic literature to study the eﬀect
of competition by comparing economies with the same market structure,
5See for example Motta (2004).
3but diﬀerent degrees of substitutability between diﬀerentiated goods (see
Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992, Aghion et al. 2001,
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). In these type of models the inverse of the
degree of substitutability coincides with the mark up. In our setup the mark
up depends on both the degree of substitutability and the number of ﬁrms in
each industry. Hence if the number of competitors increases then the mark
up decreases, so that ﬁrms’ market power reduces6.
We think that this novel theoretical mechanism can actually provide an
alternative, innovative and realistic explanation of the inverted-U-shaped
relationship between competition and growth7. Furthermore, we show that
there exists a maximum number of ﬁrms that can survive in the market:
this can be done by imposing a long run restriction on the positivity of the
balanced growth rate.
Our explanation hinges upon the presence of spillover eﬀects in the in-
termediate sector, and there is a wide empirical literature which oﬀers a
substantial support to the idea that economies of scale are an important
phenomenon both at aggregate and at sectorial level. For example, Basu
and Fernald (1997), Sbordone (1997), Jimenez and Marchetti (2002) show
that, for the U. S. economy, the overall level of returns to scale (in a Cobb-
Douglas production function) should be placed in the interval [1;1:2], so that
external increasing returns to scale should aﬀect the economy’s dynamics in
the long run as well as in the short run. Increasing returns and economies of
scale can give rise to (favorable) spillover eﬀects in the ﬁrms cost functions.
Moreover also the literature on knowledge spillover is abundant. For example
there are many works about knowledge spillovers both at regional and in-
ternational level8. Keller (2002) analyzes whether the scope of technological
knowledge spillovers is global or local (the dataset encompasses the world’s
innovative activity between 1970 and 1995). He ﬁnds that the diﬀusion of
technology is geographically localized, in accordance with the conclusions of
Adams et al. (1993), Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999) and Eaton and Kortum
(1996; 1999). However this literature does not distinguish between inter and
6The use of the degree of substitutability may also have undesirable eﬀect: as stressed
by Koeniger and Licandro (2006), a change in the elasticity of substitution modiﬁes a
fundamental parameter, which in turn may lead to diﬀerent equilibrium allocations that
cannot be straightforwardly compared across economies. In particular an increase in the
degree of substitutability has only a reallocation eﬀect which moves resources to the most
eﬃcient sector, without modifying relative prices. Hence this may lead to an overestima-
tion of the impact of competition on the economy’s growth rate.
7The presence of spillovers in manufacturing industries is well known and it is also
proved empirically (see, e.g., the literature we report below).
8See, among the others, Coe and Helpman (1995), Van Stel and Nieuwenhuijsen (2004).
4intra-sectoral spillovers. Our model supposes the existence of intra-sectoral
spillovers and this assumption is also supported by empirical ﬁndings of-
fered by the literature. Rouvinen (2002) analyzes Finland manufacturing
ﬁrms over the period 1985-1997 and ﬁnds evidence about the existence of
intra and inter-sectoral spillovers by estimating the variable cost function.
On the other hand, Malerba, Mancusi and Montobbio (2004), by means of
a panel data analysis of six OECD countries in the 1981-1995 time interval,
show that the eﬀect of intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers is 70% higher than
the eﬀect of national inter-sectoral spillovers. Brandt (2007) estimates the
cost function using data on manufacturing industries of six OECD countries
over the period 1980-1998. His main ﬁndings are that knowledge spillovers
explain some of the productivity growth observed and are identiﬁed as an
external source of economies of scale. Moreover, international intra-industry
spillovers are the most important source of externalities in the investigated
industries: they turn out to be more signiﬁcant than R&D spillovers. Fi-
nally, Badinger and Egger (2008), by considering 13 OECD countries and
15 manufacturing industries in the year 1995, ﬁnd that knowledge spillovers
occur both horizontally and vertically, whereas other types of productivity
spillovers are primarily of the intra-industry type.
Also the empirical urban economic literature supports the presence of
spillovers: it shows the importance for productivity and growth of local-
ization economies9 (economies of scale arising from spatial concentration
economies) and urbanization economies10 (economies of scale arising from
city size itself). Rosenthal and Strange (2001), for example, test the micro-
foundation of agglomerations economies for U.S. four-digit SIC codes man-
ufacturing industries in the fourth quarter of 2000 at diﬀerent levels of geo-
graphic aggregation and ﬁnd that there is evidence of the importance of all
sources of localization economies (the Marshall’s three theories of industry
agglomeration); in particular knowledge spillovers are relevant at the zipcode
level, input sharing at state level and labor market pooling is important at
all levels11.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the overall frame-
work of the model and contains an interpretation of the consequences of the
9See, e.g., Moomaw 1981, Sveikauskas 1975, Nakamura 1985, Henderson 1986 and
Ciccone and Hall 1996.
10See, e.g., Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer 1992 and Henderson, Kuncoro and
Turner 1995.
11Also Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2007) assess the importance of all the Marshallian
theories of industry agglomeration in U.S. three-digit SIC codes manufacturing industries
from 1972 to 1997.
5introduction of Cournot oligopoly (with spillover eﬀects) in the intermediate
sector. In Section 3 the steady-state expressions for the growth rate, the in-
terest rate and the probability of innovation are derived. Section 4 discusses
our main result: there exists an interval of values of the spillover parameter
such that the relationship between competition and growth is an inverted-U-
shape. Section 5 presents a numerical analysis for the UK economy, which is
based on the calibration of the degree of substitutability between intermedi-
ate goods, the spillover intensity and the size of the leading-edge innovation.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The agents
Our starting point is the standard version of the Schumpeterian growth
scheme as exposed in Barro, Sala-i-Martin (2004), Ch. 7 (a quality lad-
der model). In this scheme there are four types of agents in the economy.
Producers of ﬁnal good that use labor and intermediate goods input to pro-
duce output which is sold at a unit price and it is used for consumption, for
the production of the intermediate goods and, ﬁnally, it is invested in R&D.
The ﬁnal good sector is perfectly competitive. R&D ﬁrms devote resources
to discover a new quality of the existing intermediate good: once this one
has been invented, the winner of the race obtains a perpetual patent. We
modify this framework by considering the case in which R&D is undertaken
by outsider ﬁrms. Moreover, the winning one can sell a given number of
licenses for each sector to allow other ﬁrms to produce the quality-improved
good. Thus the last one is an oligopolistic market and we assume that ﬁrms
compete in quantity (Cournot competition). In particular we suppose that
there exist m intermediate sectors (with m large) and in each sector there are
n ﬁrms producing the same good; ﬁnally there are households who consume
the ﬁnal good and their saving ﬁnances R&D. The behavior of these agents
will be detailed in the following sections.
2.2 Final good sector







6where 0 <  < 1, Yi is output, Li is labor input, ~ xih =
Pn
j=1 ~ xihj =
Pkh
k=0 qkxihk;q > 1 represents the quality-adjusted amount employed of the
hth type of intermediate good, h refers to the generic intermediate sector
h = 1;::;m. The potential grades of each intermediate good are arrayed
along a quality ladder with rungs spaced proportionately at interval q > 1.
Fixing at q = 1 the beginning quality, the subsequent rungs are at the levels
q;q2 and so on. Thus, if kh improvements in quality have occurred in sector
h, the available grades in the sector are 1;q;q2;:::;qkh. Increases in kh are
possible thanks to the successful application of the research eﬀort.







































































12This will be proved in the following.
13We set the price of the ﬁnal good equal to one.
7where L =
P
i Li represents the aggregate labor force, assumed to be
constant. The demand function for good produced in sector h is a decreasing
function of the price.
To solve the Cournot problem in the intermediate goods sector, we need
the aggregate inverse demand function:
phkh = qkhx 1
hkh L1  (2.2)
2.3 Intermediate good sector
We assume that the winner of the R&D race does not produce directly the
invention but sells the right to produce the new good to a given number of
ﬁrms in each sector.
We suppose that there are m sectors and n ﬁrms in each one competing à
la Cournot. We assume that in each sector h there are positive externalities
or spillovers which are modelled as strategic complementarities:
@2hj
@xhj@xhl >
0;8i;l. This means that the marginal proﬁt of ﬁrm j increases as another
competitor, say l, rises its produced quantity. This implies that ﬁrm j will
ﬁnd rising its quantity convenient.









; > 0 where  represents the spillover
coeﬃcient and c(:) is a cost function. This assumption means that when a
ﬁrm l 6= j increases its production of the intermediate good, the production
cost of ﬁrm j reduces. This implies that the marginal revenue of j increases,
so that the ﬁrm ﬁnd it convenient to increase production.
We now specify the cost function. In the benchmark model the marginal
cost of intermediate ﬁrms is one unit of ﬁnal good. In the present case,







l6=j xhlkh = x j , the proﬁt function of j is:




In a Cournot oligopoly, each ﬁrm chooses the quantity to be produced
in order to maximize (2.3), where phkh characterizes the inverse demand by
the ﬁnal good sector.
The resulting optimal price and quantity (we provide the derivations in










































Now we pass to examine the inﬂuence of the spillover parameter over the op-
timal quantity and price. The results are contained in the following Propo-
sition.
Proposition 1. If (L1 qkhn+ 1
n ) > 1, then the equilibrium quantity
(2.5) is an increasing function of the spillover coeﬃcient  and the optimal
price, which is given by (2.4), is a decreasing function of .
Proof. Consider the expression of the optimal quantity (2.5) and derive it
























The second term in the square bracket is negative. If (L1 qkhn+ 1
n ) >
1, then the ﬁrst term is positive.
Moreover, since 1
(1  )2 > 1 
(1  )2, it follows that the ﬁrst term is
greater than the second one, hence the sign of the derivative is positive.
We also know that the price is decreasing in xhkh. If each oligopolist is
rising its own output, then also the total quantity produced in sector h will
increase, determining a fall in the price.
The economic intuition is the following: if the spillover coeﬃcient rises,
this causes a reduction of costs for each ﬁrm, so that the output that equals
marginal revenue to marginal cost must increase.
14The second order conditions for a maximum are satisﬁed. In fact




1  [(   2) + 2n] < 0
92.3.2 The MARK UP
Given that the optimal quantity and price are inﬂuenced by the spillover
coeﬃcient, we may expect that the mark up is also aﬀected by . In this
section we show that this does not happen.














is the marginal cost.
By using the expressions of the optimal quantity and price, we can rewrite
MU in this way:
MU =
1   
n +    1
Hence the mark up does not depend on the spillover parameter. In
particular, it is equal to the mark up that we would obtain if strategic com-
plementarities were absent15.
Hence, the eﬀects of  on price and marginal cost must have the same
magnitude, and this is due to the symmetry among the oligopolists. At a
ﬁrst glance, it may seem that the introduction of the spillover parameter
in our model is irrelevant, but this is not the case:  has nonetheless a
sizable eﬀect on both equilibrium price and quantity, as shown in the previous
section. The fact is simply that, on one hand,  has a negative impact on
the equilibrium price and this implies a reduction of the mark up. But on
the other hand, an increase in the spillover parameter reduces marginal costs
MC, and this would imply an increase of the mark-up. The two eﬀects are
exactly balanced.
Taking the limit for n which tends to inﬁnity, we ﬁnd the usual property




n +    1
= 0
Finally, the mark up depends negatively on , that is the degree of sub-
stitutability between the diﬀerentiated products, as in the standard quality-
ladder model it is: @MU
@ =   n
(n+ 1)2 < 0.
15This can be proved by redoing the previous calculations with  = 0.
102.3.3 The optimal proﬁt
Given the optimal quantity and price, we are able to compute the maximum
proﬁt for ﬁrm j in industry h:
OLIG

















proﬁt is positive for all 0 <  < 1;n  2; > 0. Moreover, we can note that
limn!1 OLIG
hj = 0.
2.3.4 The engine of growth
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 1kh as the Adjusted aggregate quality



















The key element in fostering the growth of aggregate output turns out to be
the dynamics of the quality-ladder positions, kh, in the various sectors. The
impact of Q() is ampliﬁed by the spillover eﬀect represented by , as the
exponent of q in Q() is an increasing function of . We should expect this
eﬀect because of the inﬂuence of the externality on the optimal quantities of
intermediate goods.
2.4 The R&D sector
2.4.1 Modelling destruction
In the previous sections we assumed that only the best quality kh of the inter-
mediate good h would be produced and used in each intermediate industry:
this implies that the innovation process is drastic.
16The term "adjusted" is justiﬁed by the fact that with respect to the basic model in
this case the spillover parameter appears.
11We now pass to investigate under which condition a drastic innovation
occurs.
The diﬀerent intermediate goods are perfect substitutes but are weighted
by their respective grades, and each unit of the leading-edge good is equiv-
alent to q units of the good of the previous quality. Thus, if the state of
the art is sold at a price given by(2.4), the next best quality will be sold, at
most, at the price
phkh
q . As a consequence, the following relationship holds:
phkh 1 
phkh












By substituting (2.4) and (2.5), we obtain:
n
n +    1
< q
Note that it is: q 1 < 1, while it is n
n+ 1 > 1; furthermore, the term
n
n+ 1 is decreasing in n. Thus for a high enough n, the inequality n
n+ 1 < q
is satisﬁed and the right-hand-side is also decreasing in .
We ﬁnally note that the fact of having drastic innovation or not does not
depend on the degree of spillover17.
2.4.2 Modelling creation
We consider an endogenous Poisson process. This means that the time which
should be waited for innovation to occur is a random variable which is dis-
tributed as an exponential. The parameter of this distribution constitutes
the arrival rate of the Poisson process. We assume that it depends positively
on the R&D aggregate expenditure in sector h, zhkh, and negatively on kh
for a given zhkh: the negative impact of zhkh is due to the increasing diﬃ-
culty in innovation after the initial and easier stages. The ﬂow probability
to move from kh to kh+1 is equal to:
p(kh) = zhkh'(kh)
Hence probability p is an endogenous variable, because the level of R&D
eﬀort is chosen by the R&D ﬁrms.
17The same justiﬁcation we gave for the mark up independence from the spillover pa-
rameter applies.
122.4.3 Determination of R&D eﬀort (steady-state analysis)
We assume that R&D is undertaken by outsiders, and in order to obtain the
research arbitrage condition (and to determine p), the cost of R&D activity
must be equated to respective beneﬁts. A successful innovation grants an
inﬁnitely lived patent, hence the beneﬁts of innovation are given by the
ﬂow of proﬁts starting from the moment of innovation and discounted by
the cumulative interest factor and the probability to be replaced by another
innovation. By equating costs and beneﬁts we obtain:
zhkh = p(kh)nE (hjkh+1)
Actually, once an outsider R&D ﬁrm succeeds in innovating, it obtains





is subsequently sold as license to the n ﬁrms in the intermediate sector h.







If we assume that the economy grows along a steady state path, then the





r + p(kh + 1)
r + p(kh + 1) = '(kh)n q
(1 )(kh+1)
1  
We need now to specify the functional form of '(kh). We assume con-
stant returns to scale in the relationship between the rate of return of R&D
(r + p(kh + 1)) and the demand-driven eﬀect (coming from ﬁnal good pro-
ducers) which is represented by the term q
(1 )(kh+1)
1   (recall that aggregate






 , where  is a parameter representing
the cost of doing research. In other words, a successful innovation becomes
more diﬃcult the greater the output that would be produced at the newly
attained ladder position kh + 1.
Given this assumption, the research arbitrage condition turns out to be
equal to:








So that if r is constant over time, then p also is constant.
3 The growth process








(r   ) (3.1)
where 1
 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  > 0 is the
discount rate18.
Given that this is a lab-equipment model, the market clearing condition,
Y = C + X + Z, implies that all the terms are proportional to Q() and so
gC = gY = gX = gZ = gQ = g.
To compute the growth rate of Q(), we ﬁrst consider what happens in
each sector h, then, by applying the law of large number, we describe the
economy in the aggregate.
























We assume that q
(1 )
1    1 > 0, so it must be that
1 
1   > 0. We thus
obtain a system of three equations, (2.7), (3.1) and (3.2) in three unknowns,
r, g and p.
18We assume that the population growth rate is equal to zero.
14Solving the system. By solving the system composed by (2.7), (3.1) and






















































The growth rate, as given by (3.3), depends negatively on the households’
preference parameters,  and , and on the R&D cost. On the other hand,
it is an increasing function of   and q.
Before discussing the conditions required for having a positive growth
rate g, recall that it must be: q
(1 )
1    1 > 0 and, as consequence,
1 
1   >
0; this inequality provides a ﬁrst constraint on the parameters’ values and
determines also the presence of the usual scale eﬀect.
4 Analysis of the BGP growth rate: the relation-
ship between competition and growth and the
feasibility of the BGP
In order to analyze the relationship between competition and growth, we
must however check that the balanced growth path is feasible: this in turns
implies that some suﬃcient conditions on the model’s parameters have to be
satisﬁed for having a positive g.
We ﬁrst derive the steady-state growth rate with respect to the number
of ﬁrms n in the intermediate good sector, which is the chosen measure of
competition. Our results are summarized in the following proposition:
15Proposition 2. Suppose that the number of ﬁrms is a continuous variable.
If  > 1;n  2, the balanced growth rate g in equation (3.3) is a decreasing
function of the level of competition in each intermediate sector, as measured
by n. If  < 1   , the steady state growth rate is an inverted-U-shape











growth rate is still a decreasing function of n.
Proof. In order to analyze the sign of the derivative of the growth rate with
respect to the degree of competition, it is suﬃcient to compute the derivative
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The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the curly bracket, which
in turn depends on the term   
+ 1. We must distinguish two cases:












@n < 0. However, we should
exclude the values of the spillover parameter in the interval:  2 (1   ;1),
otherwise the BGP will not be feasible.












is ambiguous. In order to make it
clearer, we analyze the sign of this derivative in correspondence of the lower








































> 0. This occurs when  > 1 
(1+)2 
~ . Note that ~  2 (0;1   ). Moreover limn!1 (n ) = 0. Thus if  2
16(~ ;1   ) the relationship between competition and growth is nonmono-
tonic: it is increasing for small values of n and decreasing for large values
of n. When instead it is  2 (0; ~ ), the function n  (n) is decreasing in a
neighborhood of n = 2 and for n ! 1.
It remains to understand the behavior of this function in the interval
n 2 (2;+1). To this aim we propose the following argument. The derivative




n+ 1 +  1
n 1
i
  1 = 0 which
is a second order equation in n:
(1      )n2   2(       + 1)n + (1   )(1      ) = 0
This equation admits two real roots. In fact, by computing the discrim-
inant we found that it is equal to 2 (1   ) > 0;80 <  < 1; > 0. We
should now check whether these roots are greater or smaller than 2.
In order to do this, we study the product and the sum of the solutions,
which are given by n1n2 =
(1 )(1 +)
1   and n1 + n2 =
2(  +1)
1   . They
are both positive as we are in the region where  < 1   , so that the roots
are greater than zero. Moreover, it can be shown that in our case
n1 + n2 > 2 and 1 < n1n2 < 2 (4.2)
We now have to distinguish between two cases:
1- If  2 (~ ;1   ), we know that the function n  (n) is increasing in
a neighborhood of n = 2 and limn!+1 n  (n) = 0. Thus we can ﬁnd a
unique global maximum in the interval (2;+1), while the other stationary
point must smaller than 2, in order to satisfy (4.2). We can conclude that
the shape of the balanced growth rate as a function of competition is an
inverted U in the relevant interval.
2- If  2 (0; ~ ), we can immediately note that the function can not
attain a minimum and then a maximum in the interval (2;+1), otherwise
conditions (4.2) would not be satisﬁed; in particular it would be that n1n2 >
2 and if conditions (4.2)must be satisﬁed, the case in which it is n1 > 2 and
n2 > 2 must be excluded. Hence, we are left with only two possibilities: i)
one of the two stationary points is greater than 2 and in this case it must be
a ﬂex with an horizontal tangent; ii) both n1 and n2 are smaller than 2.
In both cases the function turns out to be monotonically decreasing in
the interval (2;+1), and under ii) it is strictly decreasing.
These considerations conclude the proof.
The economic intuition of this result is the following. There are two ways
of fostering spillovers: an increase in , which represents the intensity of the
17external economies of scale and an increase of the number of ﬁrms in each
industries, which determines an increase in the aggregate quantity produced
by the whole industry and so a reduction of each ﬁrm’s marginal cost. Here,
for a ﬁxed , we study the eﬀect of a change in the number of ﬁrms. Suppose
that the spillovers are high. Then existing ﬁrms in the intermediate good
sector would not be favored by an increase in strategic compelentarities due
to the entrance of new ﬁrms, as the incumbents are already big: the unique
consequence would be a reduction of proﬁts.
On the other hand, if spillovers are relatively low, then it can be possible
that for a low number of ﬁrms the spillover eﬀect dominates the business
stealing eﬀect because the few existing ﬁrms would beneﬁt from more com-
petition as it increases the strategic complementarities. But when n rises
beyond a certain threshold, the business stealing eﬀect prevails again, induc-
ing a decline of the steady state growth rate. In this case, the relationship
between competition and growth is an inverted-U-shape. Hence for low val-
ues of the spillovers parameters, when the number of ﬁrms is small enough,
the spillover eﬀect is greater than the business stealing eﬀect. This interpre-
tation can be supported by the following considerations. Consider the model















































80 <  < 1;n  2
Thus if there were no spillovers in the intermediate good sector, then the
relationship between competition and growth would be negative.
We now introduce the remaining conditions which guarantee the positiv-
ity of the balanced growth rate.
Proposition 3. The balanced growth rate g, which is given by expression









+ 1 > . If this con-
dition is satisﬁed, then it is possible to identify a closed, compact set of ad-
missible values for the ﬁrms’ number in the intermediate good sector, which
are also sustainable in the long run.
18Proof. We previously assumed that q
(1 )
1     1 > 0. So, in order to have a
positive long run growth rate, it must be:   >

n , i.e.: n  > . Deﬁne
n  = h(n) and   i(n) = i, which is a constant function with respect
to n. Function h(n) is continuous in n for n > 119 and it is monotonically
decreasing if  > 1: When instead it is  < 1   , h(n) is increasing (w.r.t.











, h(n) is decreasing , as shown in the previous proposition.
We now provide a suﬃcient condition on the parameters ensuring that i
lies below h(n) for n = 2: h(2) > i. This imply that, by continuity, the two
functions must cross at least once, let us say in   n. Graphically:
The suﬃcient condition for having a positive BGP growth rate and a










































This concludes the proof.
19We remark that we are interested in n  2.
19This proposition identiﬁes an upper bound for the sustainable number of
ﬁrms in the long run, which includes the scale eﬀect of endogenous growth
models: the larger is L, the greater is the growth rate and the upper bound
of the sustainable interval of n. Furthermore, the lower are  or , the
larger is the admissible number of ﬁrms, and these two parameter also have
a negative impact on the growth rate.
4.1 The discrete case
In the previous analysis we considered the number of ﬁrms as a continuous
variable. Actually n 2 N, thus both the domain and the codomain of g (n)
are numerable. In the following proposition we show that our main result is
preserved in this case.
Proposition 4. If the number of ﬁrms in each intermediate sector is such
that n 2 N;n  2, then when  > 1, the steady state growth rate g in
equation (3.3) is a decreasing function of n, while when  < 1   , the
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Moreover, there exists the following link between the suﬃcient conditions
in the continuous and discrete case that guarantee the non monotonicity of



















Proof. We have proved before that, if n is a continuous variable, when  > 1,
the growth rate is monotonically decreasing in the number of ﬁrms. For this
values of , the monotonicity is thus preserved when n 2 N.
We now focus on the case in which is  < 1   . Consider again the













compute the ﬁrst diﬀerence
























20We now compute it for n = 2 and determine the (suﬃcient) condition on


























  ^ 
The value ^  is lower than 1   , as it can be shown by inspecting the
graph of the function f () = ^  +  when 0 <  < 1:
On the other hand, the lower bound of ^  is 1 
(1+)2, as it can be checked
from the graph of g () = ^    1 
(1+)2 (for 0 <  < 1):




















Furthermore, we know that n  (n) in the continuous case becomes de-
creasing after a certain n. This behavior is preserved in the discrete case, con-
ﬁrming the inverted-U-shape feature of the relationship between the growth
rate and the number of ﬁrms.
On the other hand, if  2 (0; ^ ), the quantity 3 (3) 2  (2) is negative.
In the continuous case we showed that for very small values for  the function
n  (n) is decreasing for n 2 (2;+1). This implies that when  lies in this
interval, our function is decreasing in the discrete case too.
This concludes the proof.
We should remark that in the proof of Proposition 3 we made use of the
fact that the growth rate is a continuous function of n. Actually both the
functions n   h(n) and   i(n)  i are discrete in n. However, for the
growth rate to be positive, an inequality is needed, so that we can disregard
the intersection between the two functions.
5 Calibration
We now adopt our framework for calibrating the values of the spillover pa-
rameter and the parameter representing the size of the leading-edge innova-
tion for the UK economy. We use UK data, so to be consistent with Aghion
et al. (2005) seminal paper20. We also need to calibrate the income share
of intermediate goods , because estimations of a production function with
only labor and intermediates are not present in the literature. To this aim,
we use the equation of the mark up, MU = 1 
n+ 1, along the lines of Aghion
et al (2005); they use the price-cost margin21 as a measure of product mar-
ket competition, which is an approximation of the Lerner index. As the
quantiﬁcation of marginal costs is notoriously diﬃcult, Aghion et al. (2005)
approximate the price-cost margin with the ratio between operating proﬁts
(net of the ﬁnancial costs) and sales. To compute this quantity, they use a
panel of 311 ﬁrms of seventeen two-digit SIC codes industries over the period
1973-1994. The average Lerner index is 4%, which yields a mark up of 4.2%.
20Most of the empirical works on the relationship between competition and growth are
based on UK data because the United Kingdom experienced a large number of policy
changes that led to exogenous variation in the nature and magnitude of competition.
21Price-cost margin is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between price and marginal cost divided
by price.
22Finally, by using the average number of ﬁrms of these sectors, we obtain
 = 0:263.
We calibrate the steady state interest rate r through equation (3.1). To
this end we set g = 2:18% (source: World Bank, 1973-1994),  =  log =
 log0:99 = 0:01 (source: DSGE literature; see for example King and Rebelo
2000),  = 122, so to obtain r = 3:18%.










p = n  
   r
calibrate  and q.
In order to measure  we choose the average Industry R&D expenditures
(by performer) over GDP, which is equal to 0.0143 (source: National Science
Foundation, 1975-1992). We then set L = 1 and p = 0:04, consistently with
the estimation performed by Caballero and Jaﬀe (2002).
Hence the resulting calibrated parameters are equal to:






2. q = 1:8652.






relationship between competition and growth has and inverted-U shape for
the UK economy.
6 Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests the presence of an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between competition and growth. But early models of endogenous
growth show that stronger competition erodes the innovator’s prospective
monopoly rent and reduces the incentive to innovate. Only recently the-
ory was able to explain the nonmonotonicity of the above relationship. Our
model can be viewed as another attempt to justify it from a theoretical point
of view. We found a set of circumstances under which the behavior of the
growth rate as a function of the number of ﬁrms in each industry switches
22If we consider a greater value for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution, this does not change the conclusion on the spillover parameter. The same applies
if we consider a diﬀerent discount rate, for example  = 0:03. Thus our analysis is robust
to changes in parameter values.
23form increasing to decreasing. The growth rate increases with the number of
ﬁrms for small degrees of competition, as the spillover eﬀect dominates the
business-stealing eﬀect; when competition becomes tougher, and the Schum-
peterian eﬀect of a reduction of proﬁts prevails, the growth rate decreases
with the number of ﬁrms.
By applying our model to the UK data, for the 1973-1994 period, we
found that the calibrated value of the spillover parameter lies in the re-
gion where the the relationship between competition and growth is non-
monotonic.
These considerations may provide a rationale for antitrust policies aimed
at fostering competition in innovative sectors: in industries where the strate-
gic complementarities are not too strong and not too weak, policy makers
should enhance competition in order to reach a higher growth rate.
24Appendix. Derivations of the optimal price and the
optimal quantity
Each representative ﬁrm in sector h solves the following problem
max
xhjkh









hkhxhjkh + phkh = 1
(x j )
Summing all ﬁrst order conditions for all ﬁrms in an industry (the sum

























Equation (2.2) can now be derived with respect to xhkh:
p0
hkh = (   1)qkhx 2
hkh L1 
p0
hkhxhkh = (   1)qkhx 1
hkh L1 
By using (2.1), the last equation turns out to be equal to:
p0











L1  = (   1)phkh
(.1)
Now consider the term 1
(x j ). By deﬁnition it is: xhkh =
Pn
j=1 xhjkh,
while, by the assumption of symmetry, it is xhkh =
Pn
j=1 xhjkh = nxhjkh )
xhjkh = 1
nxhkh. So x j =
P
l6=j xhlkh = n 1
n xhkh. These facts, together with







































By plugging (.1) and (.2) into the sum of the ﬁrst order conditions of
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This expression allows us to compute the optimal quantity produced by








































26Thus the equilibrium quantity produced by the sector h oligopolists is
equal to:
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